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Brian Boyd’s monumental On the Origin of Stories lives up to the promise of its title: it is a 
comprehensive as well as detailed attempt to reconstruct the evolutionary history of art and 
fiction, embracing the entire spectrum of art and art-like practices from their scattered phy-
logenetic antecedents and analogues in both remote and closer related species, to the various 
manifestations of art and fiction among early humans, to changing forms and functions of sto-
ries since the beginnings of the historical record. It may even be the most comprehensive and 
detailed of all existing attempts to theorize literary phenomena from an evolutionary perspec-
tive. Yet, there might be a reason why other attempts in this field have refrained from painting 
a picture as complete as Boyd has undertaken to present. Boyd achieves his aim only by con-
ceptually binding together many different things. This allows him to state hypotheses that, 
while potentially valid in one case, pretend validity for all elements of the ›class‹ and thus 
smooth the way for a Darwinian story of ›origin‹. I believe that Boyd succumbs to the prob-
lem of what I would like to call the adaptationization of abstract concepts. The genealogy he 
constructs does not look very surprising: art derives from play, and fiction, naturally, is a sub-
category of art; religion is a descendant of fiction, and play, art, fiction, and religion are, of 
course, all »adaptations«. I doubt that evolution works in steps which mirror our philosophical 
classification systems. Despite my reservations about Boyd’s overarching theory, however, I 
must stress at the outset that he makes many convincing, sometimes truly innovative points in 
the rich detail of his study – even if identifying these points, as we will see, is not a walk in 
the park for the reader. 
 
The book has two major parts of roughly equal length. In the first 200 pages, Boyd develops 
his evolutionary-theoretical framework and reconstructs the emergence of art, narrative, and 
fiction. The last half comprises the extensive study of two literary examples: the Odyssey and 
Dr. Seuss’ Horton Hears a Who! With introductory and concluding chapters and notes, the 
study covers about 450 pages, completed by a 50-page bibliography and an index of names 
and concepts that spans an impressive 30 pages. 
 
Speaking to an audience mainly from the humanities, Boyd wisely begins by refuting a couple 
of common prejudices against the idea of a universal human nature and the assumptions of 
evolutionary biology. Not all of these refutations are equally concise in argument, but Boyd 
usefully recapitulates some basic issues of evolutionary thinking and skillfully avoids the risk 
of expatiating on ideological debates. As a result, this short first chapter is both informative 
for the skeptic and not boringly redundant for the already-convinced. For those who would 
like to know more exactly where in the heterogeneous field of evolutionary criticism, literary 
Darwinism, and cognitive poetics Boyd positions his own approach, he makes some interest-
ing and insightful remarks about this matter in his »Conclusion«. 
 
Boyd continues by introducing the core conceptions of »evolution«, »adaptation«, »byprod-
uct«, and »function«, and also provides a survey of the emergence and research program of 
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evolutionary psychology. Intelligence and cooperation, two aspects of particular significance 
for our species as well as for Boyd’s later argument, are granted a more extensive exposition 
in two separate chapters. This section of the book contains fairly readable (and for the most 
part1 reliable and evenhanded) synopses of a huge body of research. 
 
But subsequent chapters, presenting Boyd’s own accounts of two significantly human traits, 
namely art and play, are less well arranged. To a large extent, Boyd leaves it to the reader to 
reconstruct a precise line of argument from his broad-based discussion of relevant issues. The 
argumentative structure that Boyd does offer is sometimes misleading. An example is the 
moment when he generously thanks Steven Pinker for »stating so pungently the hypothesis of 
art as a byproduct«, because 
 
the hypothesis fails – and therefore contributes to the case for arts as not a byproduct but an adaptation: 
If art involved no benefit, if it only mimicked biological advantage, as drugs do, by delivering unearned 
pleasure, yet it had high costs in time, energy, and resources, then a predisposition to art would be a 
weakness that would long ago have been weeded out by the intensity of evolutionary competition. (83, 
emphasis in the original) 
 
This struck me as a multiply flawed attempt at logical refutation. First of all, the failure of 
Pinker’s byproduct hypothesis would necessitate2 the hypothesis of art as an adaptation only if 
all the arts were one and the same thing (I shall come back to this point). However, Pinker 
merely »proposed that many of the arts [!] may have no adaptive function at all.«3 Second: I 
think Boyd is correct to state that Pinker’s propositions »depend on seeing art as consump-
tion« and he rightly reminds us that »before we respond to art we have to generate it« (82). 
Pinker’s idea of artworks as simply »pressing our pleasure buttons«4 indeed focuses strongly 
on certain reception aspects, but for these, at least, Pinker has given a valid evolutionary ex-
planation.5 Moreover, this explanation can accommodate the long-standing opinion that there 
is something in art that seems to be for its own sake, ›autonomous‹ and of intrinsic value. 
Thus, I cannot see any ›failure‹ on Pinker’s part. Pinker »successfully explains many features 
of the arts,« even though »there is much that [he] leaves unexplained,« as John Tooby and 
                                                 
1
 My hedge here is due to Boyd’s assumption that the »leading proponents« of recent sociobiology »have come 
to accept the need for multilevel selection theory« (52, emphasis in the original). This casual remark very ele-
gantly veils the fact that multilevel selection theory (MLST) is by no means the undisputed orthodoxy in current 
biology. Wilson/Wilson 2007, which is Boyd’s general reference in that passage, aims to make MLST, including 
a revised concept of group selection, more accepted in a discipline in which »it is still common to read in articles 
and textbooks that group selection is wrong because ›the gene is the fundamental unit of selection‹« (David 
Sloan Wilson/Edward O. Wilson, Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology, The Quarterly Review 
of Biology 82 [2007], 328-348, 336). The issues at stake in resolving that controversy require reasoning on a very 
sophisticated level of evolutionary theory and also having some knowledge of genetics, and it is not my job, as a 
literary scholar, to decide that case. (Let me note in passing that some of the applications of MLST I have seen, 
like examining the ›reproduction‹ of conservative milieus as compared to liberal ones, really make me worried 
that MLST is but a carte blanche for a radical biologization of cultural history – by biologists who have appar-
ently never heard of that also well-advanced academic discipline called sociology.) But regardless of whether 
MLST is right in principle or not, I believe that Boyd is wrong to make an ongoing scientific discussion seem 
like an established doctrine just because he uses group selection to strengthen his hypothesis of art as an adapta-
tion. 
2
 There are three possibilities to classify a given behavior biologically: adaptation, byproduct, genetic noise. 
Boyd rightly precludes the third possibility for art (cf. 34). 
3
 Steven Pinker, Toward a Consilient Study of Literature, Philosophy and Literature 31 (2007), 161-177, 171. 
4
 Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works, London 1999, 525. 
5
 Pinker’s explanation of such phenomena, by the way, is not at all incompatible with Boyd’s own suggestion of 
art as ›cognitive play with patterns‹. Also later on, when Boyd compares »our sometimes indiscriminate appetite 
for social information« (producing »an endless fascination with character information«) with »our continued 
craving for sweet and fat« (165), he comes pretty near to Pinker’s idea of the arts as being kind of ›cheesecake 
for the mind‹.  
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Leda Cosmides, in a similar approach to that question, much more reasonably put it.6 So what 
about the high costs of art that Boyd mentions as counter-evidence? This is going to be my 
third point. 
 
One of Boyd’s major examples of costly art is the ancient Chauvet cave drawings in France. 
Boyd is to be applauded for taking the time to make his readers seize the significance of these 
early manifestations of human art by emphasizing that for their creators, these drawings obvi-
ously 
 
seemed worth executing in a site difficult to access but sure of preservation. The wall markings were 
hardly the casual doodles of idle afternoons. The grotto at Chauvet was no dwelling place, and the 
drawings were no stone-age wallpaper. This remote cave, deep underground, accessible only by the 
light of a burning brand or a tallow candle, seems to have been selected precisely for its remoteness 
from disturbance, whether by weather, plant, or animal, expressly to preserve the art of particularly 
awe-inspiring craftsmen. (8) 
 
Boyd rightly informs us that »[n]ature selects against a cost without benefit, as when it dis-
penses with sight in burrowing or cave-dwelling animals« (83). This is one of the evolution-
ary rules of thumb that productively apply as long as we talk of physical traits and instinctive 
behavior, that is, evolutionarily ›hard-wired‹ mechanisms shaped by selection. Arguing for a 
view of ›art as adaptation‹, Boyd obviously does assume that there is an art ›instinct‹, the high 
costs of which are balanced by the many benefits of art Boyd presents in the later chapters. 
But let us stop and think about this assumption for a moment. 
 
An alternative explanation would be that art is an eminently cultural behavior. I do not mean 
to advocate a simplistic nature/culture distinction here. Rather I want to emphasize that adap-
tations are not all we need when explaining human behavior. We also have to take into ac-
count the (not specifically adaptive, or even detrimental) side-effects of these adaptations and, 
more importantly, the complex cultural combinations of a multitude of instinctive tendencies 
and their side-effects. Those combinations were not shaped by natural selection (although 
they do use a number of biological substrates that were) but rather emerge every now and then 
in this or that culturally more or less stabilized, conventionalized form. Some of these forms 
may involve unreasonably high ›costs‹ (and many people in human history have even lost 
their lives for eminently cultural reasons). However, in order to eliminate those behaviors 
from the human genetic program, natural selection would have to eliminate the biological 
substrates and thus also dispense with the adaptive advantages for which these substrates have 
been selected, and which have obviously been significant enough to outweigh the concomitant 
(but less stable) negative side-effects from the outset. In that way, evolution simply tolerates a 
lot of potential behaviors that are not themselves adaptive, or even detrimental. Given that 
Boyd does not mean to advocate a panadaptionist view,7 he will surely agree with me that 
there are two theoretically possible answers to the question how art can involve such high 
costs. Let me show briefly why I prefer the ›cultural‹ explanation over Boyd’s adaptationist 
one. 
 
                                                 
6
 John Tooby/Leda Cosmides, Does Beauty Build Adapted Minds? Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Aesthet-
ics, Fiction and the Arts, SubStance. A Review of Theory and Literary Criticism 30 (2001), 6-27, 11. 
7
 I am unsure about this point, however. Boyd does not disclaim the concept and existence of evolutionary by-
products. However, he hardly ever mentions a byproduct in his study without immediately making it the exapta-
tion of another adaptation. This is the normal, and completely correct, procedure for reconstructing (»reverse-
engineering«) the multilayered evolutionary history of an adaptation. The problem is, however, that I do not con-
sider all of Boyd’s ›adaptations‹ to really be (biological) adaptations. So, this (along with the way he likes to cite 
Stephen Jay Gould) indeed makes me wonder whether Boyd can think of any kind of behavior that is not ›an 
adaptation‹. The one time he does, he has rather peculiar reasons; cf. note 30. 
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»Michelangelo’s years on his back painting the Sistine Chapel ceiling« (83): did Michelan-
gelo really spend his time that way because evolution explicitly favored people doing such 
weird things, or because he, for certain socio-cultural reasons, believed in the worth of what 
he was doing (and also because that was his way to earn a living)? To put it differently: to 
what extent was Michelangelo’s motivation ›instinctively‹ biased – to roughly the same extent 
to which beavers are instinctively motivated to build dams? Note that this is Boyd’s own ex-
ample. Evolution has engineered the genetic tendency in beavers to build dams; »[l]ikewise«, 
as Boyd says, it has engineered an »inclination« or »disposition to art« into humans (83). 
Boyd, too, is of course aware of Michelangelo’s socio-cultural motives and this is why Mi-
chelangelo is mentioned again, some pages later, as an example of art as »a potent means of 
earning the currency of status« (111) – one of the many reasons, according to Boyd, art was 
selected for. Furthermore, what Karl Eibl has dubbed ›secondary severity‹8, where cultural 
functions are superimposed upon basically playful (›autonomous‹) behaviors, is by no means 
missing in Boyd’s comprehensive system; but it is, again, shifted to the biological level. The 
painstaking commitment of the ancient cave painters, of Michelangelo lying on his back, or 
medieval people building cathedrals (cf. 118), according to Boyd, might be the result of a bio-
logical disposition for ›costly rituals‹. Religion, as an adaptation to enhance social coopera-
tion, employs costly – and, for some reason, preferably costly artful – signals »as a guarantee 
of allegiance« (117) and thus, once more, promotes art as an adaptive trait in humans. 
 
By this point, it has become apparent that what Boyd brings to the fore as the many benefits 
of art are in fact a kind of fortuitous effect (to use George Williams’ words9) that art produces 
in various contexts, rather than its ›adaptive function(s)‹ per se. And indeed at this point in his 
exposition Boyd has quietly abandoned that term and has replaced it with less strict ones. Af-
ter about a hundred pages, he even makes a surprising distinction, saying that one of those 
many benefits »could become a powerful sustainer of art and indeed perhaps its main func-
tion, even in strict evolutionary terms« (118, emphasis in the original). Even in strict evolu-
tionary terms? So what language does he think he has been speaking hitherto? 
 
As the above-mentioned byproducts of adaptations include not only neutral or negative but 
also positive side-effects, there are indeed such things as fortuitous effects in evolutionary his-
tory. If a trait which is selected as a successful reply to a specific selection pressure also 
proves beneficial in many other contexts, this does not make that trait an adaptation to those 
contexts; that is, the other beneficial contexts are not being integrated into the ›hard-wired‹ 
design as additional triggering mechanisms.10 However, behaviors involving that trait might 
unsolicitedly occur in these contexts very frequently and, if these contexts are multitudinous, 
thus make a cluster of interrelated behaviors very typical, almost omnipresent in a species. 
Behaviors which thusly »exploit«, as Williams said, the »incidental effect[s]« of existent 
traits,11 are not the expression of a genetically fixed adaptation specifically designed to fit this 
plurality of contingent additional contexts, but they may yet be the result of a more general 
adaptive trait: the inclination to repeat and imitate behaviors that have already proven success-
ful under similar conditions. – In other words, the many (cognitive, physical, perceptual, emo-
tional, etc.) traits involved in artistic behavior all have their own particular origin; they do not 
                                                 
8
 Karl Eibl, Zwei Kulturen? Zwei Denkweisen und ihre biologischen Ursprünge, in: Karl Eibl/Katja Mell-
mann/Rüdiger Zymner (eds.), Im Rücken der Kulturen, Paderborn 2007, 31-48; Karl Eibl, Kultur als Zwischen-
welt. Eine evolutionsbiologische Perspektive, Frankfurt a. M. 2009, 169-172. 
9
 George Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection, Princeton 1966, 4, 261, and passim. – Note that Boyd ex-
plicitly cites Williams as authority for his definition of »adaptation«; cf. note 18. 
10
 Except in the particular case that it serves as an exaptation for the adaptive reply to another specific selection 
pressure. But then we also have a second adaptation in its own right, not »different functions [...] at different 
times« (206) of one and the same adaptation; cf. my following remarks on the analytical term of »adaptation«. 
11
 Williams 1966, 13. 
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become a new adaptation of ›art‹ just because they are used in art. Michelangelo is probably 
not ›triggered‹ to artfully paint the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel the way a beaver is triggered 
to build a dam in a particular set of situational conditions. However, if certain combinations of 
those many traits are also good means to install and maintain social hierarchies and belief sys-
tems, to appease adversaries, attract potential mates, reduce bodily stress,12 attune group 
members and deepen social cohesion, – indeed why not use these combinations as often as 
possible? In that way, evolution not only tolerates, but also allows for a stunning overrepre-
sentation of some self-suggesting (albeit unstable) behaviors. 
 
Thus, Boyd’s monumental network of the multilayered and mutually enhancing benefits of art 
ultimately is an unprecedentedly elaborate description of art’s earliest history.13 It shows how 
that cluster of interrelated behaviors which we today summarize under the abstract notion of 
›art‹ could grow to »such a central part of all cultures« (71). My dissent arises solely from the 
fact that he sees this earliest history of art not as part of a (prehistoric yet still) cultural history 
but as a close-knit net of biological selection processes. On the one hand, he sometimes seems 
to distinguish what we called fortuitous effects above from the »strict evolutionary terms« of 
function and adaptation, and after two hundred pages he even very suddenly speaks of »cul-
tural evolution«.14 On the other hand, he constantly strives to tie down every new benefit as 
being, indeed, a biologically relevant advantage on the level of group selection.15 And, what is 
even more surprising, he underhandedly modifies the evolutionary-theoretical terms to serve 
his own purpose by repeatedly pointing out that the function of a particular design »need not 
be a single one« (37, see also 80f. and 113) and thus also enthusiastically anticipating »a ple-
thora of functions« for art (100). This is not standard biology. 
 
The term »adaptation« in evolutionary biology is an analytical concept. It signifies a specific 
design feature in correlation with an equally specific selection pressure which defines its 
»adaptive value« or »function« (and here theorists use »function« in the singular16 simply by 
definition). Thus, »adaptation« refers to units that are not necessarily identical with things as 
they occur to us in everyday understanding (like ›eyes‹, ›hands‹, ›legs‹17), but instead with a 
                                                 
12
 See Karl Eibl, Animal poeta. Bausteine der biologischen Kultur- und Literaturtheorie, Paderborn 2004, 312-
319. I missed this aspect in Boyd’s list of the benefits of art. Maybe the special consideration of such simply 
›relaxing‹ effects of art is too Pinkeresque for his taste. But seriously, once we move to the level of the many 
beneficial uses of innate mechanisms, there is no such thing as an exhaustive list. 
13
 Cf. his remark that »the history of art runs so deep that it has been engrained in the psyche« (73). The question 
is, certainly, what »engrained« is supposed to mean. Boyd’s conception of art’s psychological engrainment obvi-
ously goes beyond the idea of just ›self-suggesting (albeit unstable) behaviors‹. 
14
 »In the evolution of biological adaptations, different functions may dominate at different times. Bird wings 
apparently evolved first as thermoregulatory flaps, and can still be used that way, but they much more centrally 
serve what is now their main function and what has shaped their recent evolution: flight. In the same way, our 
predisposition to fiction has served different functions at different stages of cultural evolution.« (206) 
15
 For the problem of group selection cf. note 1. 
16
 Cf. the central »question: ›What is its function?‹« as formulated by Williams 1966, 252. Williams calls for 
»rigorous criteria for deciding whether a given character is adaptive, and, if so, to precisely what it is an adapta-
tion« (4, my emphasis). Accordingly, he repeatedly marks »the mistake of assuming that a beneficial effect is 
necessarily a function« (146) or »that when one demonstrates that a certain biological process produces a certain 
benefit, one has demonstrated the function, or at least a function of the process. This is a serious error« (209, 
emphasis in the original), because »the demonstration of effects, good or bad, proves nothing. To prove adapta-
tion one must demonstrate a functional design« (212; similarly 261). 
17
 Cf. Boyd’s illustration of ›multifunctional adaptations‹ by the examples of human hands (131), bird wings (cf. 
note 14), and »an elephant’s trunk, which evolved to sniff, dislodge, grasp, pull, deliver, push, twist, caress, 
trumpet, siphon, and squirt« (81). This is evolutionary theory for preschool, if you will pardon my saying so. 
Sniffing, grasping, etc., are not adaptive »functions« but different uses of the trunk, which as a whole is not »an 
adaptation« itself. Instead, the elephant needs a vast range of specialized mechanisms (»adaptations«) to show 
such many different uses in the first place: an entire olfactory system in its perceptual apparatus, a sophisticated 
muscular system at the end of the trunk, as well as psychic mechanisms that tell it when and how to caress and 
 6 
retrospectively specified, and often microscopic change of structure (e.g., the reacquisition of 
retinal cones in diurnal cenozoic mammals, the opposable thumb in monkeys, or the enlarge-
ment of the menisci with erect movement). Although Boyd, with reference to George Wil-
liams (35f.) and Nikolaas Tinbergen (41), seems to deploy this strictly analytical concept of 
adaptation, in actual fact he departs significantly from it. The concept he actually employs is a 
made-up notion of »adaptation«, idiosyncratically extended to include multifunctionality.18 In 
a word, Boyd’s terminology is sloppy, and ultimately inconsistent. This stands in stark con-
trast to the claim for logical rigor with which he means to ›refute‹ Pinker. 
 
These deficiencies in Boyd’s evolutionary-theoretical framework go hand in hand with an-
other problem: the abstract category of ›art‹. I enjoyed reading Boyd’s introduction, in which 
he zeros in on what he means by »art« by comparing it with various protoforms in the animal 
kingdom. Although he does not take the pain to summarize them for his readers, it becomes 
quite clear that his criteria19 for labeling specific behaviors »art« are playful engagement, an 
endeavor for skillful design20, an implicit directedness to others as audience, and a basic rep-
resentational dimension. This seems to me an excitingly good, ethological definition of art!21 
And although this is not perfectly displayed in the arrangement of the body of his book, his 
analysis can be understood as recounting the history of the emergence of that four-
dimensional thing called art. This is another way of saying that I find parts of his reconstruc-
tion fairly convincing if I take them as an explanation of how we have come to have such a 
cultural (!) concept of art22 and why we find the ›thing‹ it refers to in quite similar forms even 
across cultures23. But still I would say that even this intuitive and universally applicable con-
cept is an abstraction from many different things (even within one culture), and thus is not a 
good starting point for an adaptationist analysis. Boyd rejects the position that »art is not a 
meaningful category« or not »a coherent class« rather laconically, saying that, »while art is 
indeed a fuzzy category, so is much else that matters in life, like love, which there is also rea-
son to think has a biological origin, mechanism, and function« (69f.). Well – no. According to 
Helen Fisher, ›love‹ involves (at least) three different mechanisms which emerged as solu-
                                                                                                                                                        
when and in what tone to trumpet. And even then we have not yet got down completely to the level of minuscule 
changes in structure that marks the optimal analytical unit and allows for the correlation with a specific selection 
pressure (»function«). To put it another way: We might observe primates to have a mechanism that inclines them 
to pick their nose in a certain kind of situations. To frequently free the respiratory tract from obstructions, but 
only when there is nothing more important to do, might well be adaptively functional. But this is not to say that 
›the primate hand – a highly multifunctional design – evolved to pick one’s nose, among others‹.  
18
 Just a glimpse at how this works: Boyd introduces George Williams as the person »who clarified the modern 
concept of biological adaptation« (my emphasis) and who »sees it as a powerful but strict and demanding no-
tion, not to be used without warrant« (35f.). Alright! On the next page, when Boyd teaches his readers that »[t]he 
function need not be a single one« – »as biologists say, ›one ancestral, many derived functions‹« (37) –, this quo-
tation is followed by a footnote indicating an essay by the literary scholar Paul Hernadi and an article on the par-
ticular subject of mammalian play from The Quarterly Review of Biology. A suitable reference in the usual au-
thorities, like Williams or Tinbergen, apparently was not at hand. In the latter of the two cited articles, the »one 
ancestral, many derived functions« conception is, in turn, quoted from another article on animal play by another 
biologist, whose suggestions are much of the kind depicted in note 17. So, that’s the end of »as biologists say«. 
Nevertheless, when coming to the proper object of his study, Boyd insouciantly rephrases his definition as fol-
lows: »An evolutionary adaptation, recall, is a feature of body, mind, or behavior that [...] shows evidence of 
good design for a specific function or functions that will ultimately make a difference to the species’ survival and 
reproductive success« (80, emphasis in the original). In the note we find: »G. Williams 1966.« No page number. 
As for the careful reader, who might be interested in whether the oddly interpolated »or functions« is Boyd’s or 
Williams’ idea, well, he may go and read »G. Williams 1966« (or have a look at my quotations in note 16). 
19
 Cf. his assumption (without listing) of »features common to all forms of art« (69). 
20
 Cf. also 81.  
21
 But, alas, when Boyd wants to »define« art, he simply puts forward his aetiological derivation of art as »cogni-
tive play with patterns« (15), which covers only one, or two at best, of the criteria implied in his introduction. 
22
 Cf. Boyd’s own remark on the »key question: how did things begin to be considered as art?« (73) 
23
 Cf. 70. 
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tions to distinct adaptive problems.24 The many different cultural concepts of love observed in 
history are thus due to the fact that these mechanisms combine differently, and congregate 
with other mechanisms, in each period, milieu, and individual. Of course all these different 
combinations are also quite similar, if seen from another angle, simply because they share a 
certain set of biological substrates. 
 
All this is not just a quibble about words. Boyd’s reckless inconsistencies and idiosyncratic 
coinages have a bearing on the argumentative detail of his study. When he says, for example, 
that one of art’s functions is social attunement, he can perhaps make it seem plausible that »in 
the time-based arts of human music and dance, we synchronize feeling and movement, learn 
how to coordinate in time and tone, and draw comfort and strength from our physical and 
emotional attunement« (105f.). His subsequent remarks on »visual art« serving »as an omni-
present reinforcement of shared norms« and on »pretend play and fiction« enabling us »to try 
out the position of others« (106), however, seem to be present merely as a matter of duty in 
order to assure us that this function really applies to all forms of art, even though the function 
itself in fact finally exceeds any literal meaning of attunement. Why not say, for example, that 
our sense of rhythm probably evolved as a means of social coordination? This would be a hy-
pothesis concise enough to be tested further. And of course many arts make use of our sense 
of rhythm, but this is not to say that ›art‹ was selected as a means of social coordination (or 
›attunement‹). – Another example: Boyd’s preoccupation with the arts makes him occasion-
ally overstate their significance in early human history, arguing, for instance, that they serve 
as »incentives for social exchange«, »long-distance trade«, and »discovery, in materials, proc-
esses, products« (123). I might have a rather boring notion of »weaving and pottery« (ibid.), 
for example, but I wonder if the immediate practical need to protect the body or to hold liq-
uids is not an incomparably stronger ›incentive‹ than any admittedly existent playful engage-
ment with materials and forms. Yet as art »foster[s] our inclination to think about possible 
worlds« and »builds our confidence [...] in shaping our own destinies« (124), it is not simply 
›art‹ – in any strict (aetiological25, or four-dimensional behavioral) sense – that he talks of 
here but, much more generally, »imagination« (ibid.), »creative habits of mind« (123), con-
structiveness, and so on. To be sure, art, imagination, creativity, constructiveness all have 
something to do with one another and moving around such abstract concepts like cards on the 
table is an old routine in the humanities. But Boyd, of course, purports to be making a 
stronger, more precise and theoretically grounded claim than this. 
 
Another reason why it is often difficult to extract a clear line of argument from Boyd’s text is 
that he completely avoids comparing his own suggestions with already existing accounts. He 
indeed cites a vast range of biological, psychological, and anthropological literature, but he 
remains surprisingly silent with regard to studies from his own discipline taking an evolution-
ary approach as well as studies coming from the human sciences which are specifically con-
cerned with literary phenomena. Since the definition of ›art as cognitive play with patterns‹ is 
so important to his book, it is quite odd not to compare his considerations with those of Tooby 
and Cosmides as developed in their seminal essay »Does Beauty Build Adapted Minds«.26 He 
might have learned there (along with some other things) that play also is probably not ›an ad-
                                                 
24
 Helen Fisher, Lust, Attraction, Attachment. Biology and Evolution of the Three Primary Emotion Systems for 
Mating, Reproduction, and Parenting, Journal of Sex Education and Therapy 25 (2000), 96-104. 
25
 Cf. note 21. 
26
 He cites them by mentioning a side-aspect of their essay (49/422, note 21) and by using a handy phrase about 
the anomaly of fiction (129/433, note 2), but not a single time in his chapter on cognitive play! Maybe he thinks 
he has already finished with their considerations since he rejected their essay in his contribution to The Literary 
Animal. For a critique of his criticism see Katja Mellmann, Evolutionary Psychology as a Heuristic in Literary 
Studies, in: Simon J. James/Nicholas Saul (eds.), The Evolution of Literature. Legacies of Darwin in European 
Cultures, Amsterdam (forthcoming), note 65. 
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aptation‹ but rather an statistical effect of many particular »developmental adaptations« or 
»aesthetics«. And with all his emphasis on art’s significance for arousing and shaping atten-
tion, one might have wanted to know a little more about what his theory has in common with 
Ellen Dissanayake’s concept of ›making special‹ and also the points at which he differs from 
her, or perhaps amends her propositions.27 Similarly, his thoughts about the social functions 
of storytelling show important points of contact with hypotheses developed in Williams 
Flesch’s Comeuppance, but Boyd only refers to him once rather snidely (63/424, note 41) and 
does not even try a productive comparison between his own and Flesch’s suggestions, or a 
critical discussion of the latter. H. Porter Abbott’s reconstruction of »the prehistory of narra-
tive consciousness«28 is either unknown or not worth mentioning to Boyd. And Michelle Scal-
ise Sugiyama, who for a decade now has been examining tens of thousands of pages of ethno-
graphic literature to test her hypothesis of narrative being originally a means to store and ex-
tract adaptive information, is cited in a way (176/440, note 47) that shows total disregard for 
her overarching project. Thus, in respect to scholarly exchange Boyd’s book remains an an-
noyingly monolithic statement. 
 
Narrative, however, brings me to the more felicitous chapters in Boyd’s book. His sketch of 
the many cognitive capabilities involved in understanding and representing events – from the 
animate/inanimate distinction across human ›theory of mind‹,29 memory, and mental simula-
tion, to mimesis and diegesis – has a lot in common with previous accounts in the field of 
›cognitive poetics‹ (in a broad sense) which draw on a similar corpus of research from devel-
opmental psychology, the cognitive sciences, neurology, and primatology. Yet Boyd’s very 
detailed sketch not only once again supports those ideas by coming to largely the same con-
clusions, but he also further substantiates the postulated algorithms from an evolutionary 
standpoint. Here, his evolutionary-ethological perspective proves particularly useful and en-
lightening. And it keeps him save from the pitfall – so common in many similar accounts – of 
overemphasizing an individual component (like ›empathy‹, ›imitation‹, or ›neural mirroring‹) 
as the all-explaining key issue. Also in his reflections on how the strategic exchange of social 
information relates to competitive and cooperative contexts (160-174), Boyd makes original 
statements and refinements. 
 
In view of the eloquence with which Boyd describes the many spontaneous behavioral incli-
nations we reveal as story tellers and listeners (165-173), I am surprised that he does not con-
template an innately biased adaptation ›storytelling/narrative exchange of social information‹ 
(the adaptive value of which he would seem to have established quite convincingly) but in-
stead prefers to grant ›fiction‹ (186-208) the status of the next big adaptation.30 The problem 
is, however, that it remains completely unclear what exactly he understands by »narration«, 
                                                 
27
 There are several references to Dissanayake in his notes but no explicit discussion of her theory of art. 
28
 H. Porter Abbott, The Evolutionary Origins of the Storied Mind. Modeling the Prehistory of Narrative Con-
sciousness and Its Discontents, Narrative 8 (2000), 247-256. 
29
 I wondered why Boyd places so much emphasis on the fact that a theory of mind (ToM) including represented 
beliefs is uniquely human (143, 145, 148). There is some (albeit not undisputed) evidence that other primates too 
may pass false-belief tests, at least in more domain-specific (foremost competitive) settings, and are capable of 
deception (which Boyd treats as an equal test case, 147). Moreover, other animals simply have not yet been in-
vestigated in that regard. The difference between humans’ and other animals’ ToM, albeit vast, might not be as 
clearly categorical as Boyd suggests. But I want to add that it is of no relevance for Boyd’s argument whether the 
uniqueness of human ToM begins with the representation of beliefs itself or rather with its sophistication through 
language (cf. 149). 
30
 He says the »advantages of [our capability to represent events] are so apparent« that its explanation (unlike 
that of fiction) poses »no untoward biological challenge« (188). Again, what kind of evolutionary theory is at 
work in this formulation? 
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»story/storytelling«, »pretense«, and »fiction«,31 and which functions and design precursors 
he assigns to which of them. If I may just make a guess about the core assumption in this 
large tangle of issues, I would say that Boyd sees the reliably developing capacity for pretend 
play in children – helping them to »explore [...] the possible around the real« (186) – as a 
clue32 about a special cognitive design (labeled »fiction«) the effects of which are not already 
covered by the capacity for narration (or any other cognitive capacities one might think of). 
The pertinent functions can be readily identified, since play generally helps develop our neu-
ral circuits and stories of any kind (the Bible, Aesop’s animal fables, Robinson Crusoe) make 
us better humans by training our social cognition. 
 
Boyd has no problem with the fact that most of his ›functions‹ do not specifically depend on 
fiction but could also be linked to non-fictional storytelling, or even to art and play in general 
(hence the vast amount of redundant information in this chapter). The only function that, in a 
way, is specifically related to fiction is the ›enhancement of our creativity‹ (197), which fi-
nally leads us back into the realm of imagination, creativity, and constructiveness. So what 
about hypothetical reasoning, here/there or once/now distinctions, conditional if/then episte-
mologies, probability, provisional validity, mythology, history, utopia, should/would reason-
ing, and so on?33 My point is that the extended capability in humans »to think in sustained 
ways beyond the here and now« (198) has already been noted numerous times, under the 
names of ›offline‹ thinking, ›decoupling‹, or ›metarepresentation‹, to name just a few; but that 
one has to be a literary scholar, obviously, to see causal and hypothetical reasoning (cf. 198), 
for instance, insistently as derivations of ›fiction‹ (whatever this is supposed to mean then) 
rather than related phenomena, or even its enablers. 
 
The Chauvet cave paintings might not have been »the casual doodles of idle afternoons«, but 
Boyd’s reflections on religion as »invented stories that people take as true« (199), science as 
»fictions of a kind« (202), and various sorts of subversive fiction (207) surely are. And so is 
the second half of his book. The Odyssey lends itself as evidence that the characteristics Boyd 
describes have always been there in human storytelling, and Dr. Seuss is evidence that they 
are still there. Nobody will be surprised. (Naturally, the analysis of two literary examples is 
also meant to provide a model for evolutionary criticism. Also, it includes a couple of further 
conceptions, like that of David Bordwell’s problem-solving theory of narration, which he had 
not already introduced in the preceding chapters. But I will stop here; other reviewers have 
already commented on those parts and I think I have made my point.) 
 
To resume, Boyd’s book presents a substandard kind of evolutionary theory on several counts 
and for the most part lacks a finalized – or at least reconstructable – argumentative architec-
ture. As a result, none of his adaptationist major assumptions prove convincing. But, with the 
necessary amendments made by the reader, Boyd’s study contains a richly faceted picture of 
art’s earliest history. Furthermore, his chapters on the cognitive prerequisites and social func-
                                                 
31
 »Narration« as ›representation‹; »story/storytelling« once in a while as ›narrative form/narration‹, once in a 
while as ›invented events/fiction‹; »pretense« as ›as-if mode‹ and, as he stresses, categorically ›different from 
representation‹ (181) or, in other places, as ›a mixture of direction, narration, and enactment‹ (177) (and thus 
also ›representation‹?); cf. also 15, 382. 
32
 Boyd generally fails to explain why and how ontogenetic development can tell us anything about innate 
mechanisms. I am sure it can; but Boyd’s saying that, »since our protracted childhood makes human life-history 
unique, it is appropriate that childhood offers our clearest window [...] on the origins of our interest in story« 
(179) indeed offers nothing that would substantiate such a claim. 
33
 Cf. the postulation of a manifold cognitive ›scope syntax‹ by Tooby/Cosmides 2001, 19-22; Leda Cos-
mides/John Tooby, Consider the Source. The Evolution of Adaptations for Decoupling and Metarepresentation, 
in: Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations. A Multidisciplinary Perspective, Oxford 2000, 53-115. 
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tions of storytelling are worthwhile reading for every narratologist interested in the biological 
dimensions of his/her object of study. 
 
As everybody knows, family conflicts can escalate all too quickly. I would not be criticizing 
Boyd’s argument this way were I not terribly interested in his propositions. Boyd’s book is 
contributing to a field which I am working in myself and which is still in an immature state of 
methodology and theory. Alas, after reading Boyd’s monumental volume, I think it rather dis-
serves than serves the necessary refinement of evolutionary literary theory and criticism. Not 
only does Boyd several times misinform his readers about central issues of evolutionary 
thinking, he also conveys a message of: Don’t worry, we don’t have to give up on our dearly 
held speculations on the ›uniquely human‹, the essence of ›art‹, ›creativity‹, ›sense of possi-
bility‹, and so on. Boyd’s book is at some points an unpleasant example of how the humani-
ties often deal with the sciences: grab some key notions, and then use them as best suits your 
purpose. I conclude with Williams: 
 
In many published discussions it is not at all clear whether an author regards a particular effect as the 
specific function of the causal mechanism or merely as an incidental consequence. In some cases it 
would appear that he has not appreciated the importance of the distinction.34 
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